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I.  INTRODUCTION 
State constitutions play an important role in the mix of American dual 
sovereignty.  In areas as broad as due process and as narrow as cruel and unusual 
punishment, state courts have construed their state constitutions to cloak their 
citizens with protections of liberty that the United States Constitution does not 
                                                                
1Allusions to Lewis Carroll and Humpty Dumpty’s famous discourse on words are not 
unusual when discussing textualism.  See, e.g., Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: 
Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 585-86 & nn.1, 4 (1994); Steven B. 
Price, Casenote & Comment, FIRREA’s Statute on the Standard of Liability for Bank 
Directors and Officers: Through the Looking Glass of New Textualism, 30 IDAHO L. REV. 219, 
219 n.1 (1993).  Nor is this connection of recent vintage.  See, e.g., ARCHIBALD E. STEVENSON, 
STATES’ RIGHTS AND NATIONAL PROHIBITION 104 (1927) (quoting CHARLES WARREN, 
SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 55 (1924)).  Lewis Carroll published Alice’s 
Adventures in Wonderland in 1865 and Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found 
There in 1872.  
2Associate Professor of Law, William H. Bowen School of Law, University of Arkansas at 
Little Rock.  
1Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
400 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:399 
provide.  While such expansions, or augmentations, of state constitutional 
prerogative are certainly the exception and not the rule, they are a fertile ground for 
novel legal theories.  Litigants and judges who disagree with federal constitutional 
doctrine may turn to state constitutional law to strike out in a different direction.  
Developments in state constitutional law may become especially important as the 
United States Supreme Court examines individual liberties in presently evolving 
areas such as drug-testing3 and same-sex marriage.4 
This tremendous latitude afforded to the states prompts the question, when and 
why should courts construe state constitutional liberties more broadly than federal 
constitutional guarantees?  One is tempted immediately to open the interpretivist’s 
toolbox and begin with textualism.  Presumably, the state constitutional provision 
that is worded identically to its federal counterpart carries the same meaning, while 
differences in wording point to differences in meaning.  However, even a cursory 
examination of state constitutional law reveals that this presumption is gravely 
flawed.   
For example, one might suspect a substantive difference in the free speech 
guarantee of the Pennsylvania Constitution—“every citizen may freely speak”5—and 
that of the U.S. Constitution—“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”6  The former seems to define an affirmative right, perhaps even 
placing upon government a duty to protect an individual’s free speech interest 
against all who would infringe upon it, whether a public or private entity.  The latter 
guarantees a right in the negative, operating only as a limitation on state power.  Yet 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has rejected such a distinction.7  In contrast, the 
Michigan Supreme Court found that nearly identical language in state and federal 
double jeopardy clauses could be subject to disparate interpretation.8 
This Article examines closely a narrow range of highly factually analogous cases, 
in which state constitutional rights are asserted despite a clear lack of entitlement to 
assert any federal constitutional claim.  Specifically, the cases selected are those in 
which private persons assert a right to conduct expressive activity, including 
electoral activity, in private shopping centers during hours when the properties are 
                                                                
3For example, student Fourth Amendment rights in the schools were severely curtailed in 
drug-testing cases Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995), and Board of 
Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 536 U.S. 
822 (2002).  Courts in Indiana first indulged then abandoned a contrary theory predicated on 
state constitutional law.  See Linke v. Northwestern Sch. Corp., 734 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2000), vacated by 763 N.E.2d 972 (Ind. 2002). 
4This issue has not yet come to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the recently famous ruling of 
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, requiring that marriage licenses issue to same-
sex couples, was predicated on that state’s constitution.  See Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. 
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
5PA. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
6U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
7W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 
1335 (Pa. 1986). 
8See Woodland v. Mich. Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337, 344, 345 & n.22 (Mich. 1985) 
(en banc). 
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held open to the general public.  These cases may be referred to colloquially as “the 
mall cases.”  Selected here are only those cases that were decided after the federal 
question became clear.  The Article first inquires into the role of textualism in these 
cases.  The Article then examines other interpretivist modes besides textualism, 
namely originalism, structuralism, and precedentialism, as well non-interpretivist 
public policy arguments.  The purpose of this inquiry is to clarify the role of 
interpretivism in state courts’ decisions on whether to expand the scope of their state 
constitutional protections for individual rights. 
II.  BACKGROUND: TAKING TEXTBOOK ENUMERATED POWERS TO THE MALL 
A.  Federal and State Constitutions 
As every American high school student learns, the federal government of the 
United States is one of enumerated powers.  Congress has authority to regulate 
commerce, for example, by virtue of Article I, section 8, clause 3, which expressly 
grants the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”9  Congress may raise a Navy only by 
virtue of the clause which grants that power.10  Although Article I, section 8, further 
empowers Congress to make “Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States,”11 the Necessary and Proper 
Clause has not been construed as a broad foundation from which Congress may 
escape the limiting scheme of enumeration.12 
To further clarify the limited nature of federal power, the Tenth Amendment 
states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”13  The present breadth of power reserved to the states under the Tenth 
Amendment is surely disputed.14  But the fundamental notion of limited federal 
power remains intact.15  Federal sovereignty is carved out from the whole of state 
                                                                
9U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
10U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
11U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
12McColluch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (affirming that 
Congressional powers are limited, even though Congress is to be granted broad discretion in 
its choice of means). 
13U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
14See, e.g., Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1642-50 
(2002).  There is ample literature concerning adoption and construction of the Tenth 
Amendment.  See, e.g., THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (Mark R. Killenbeck ed., 2002); RAOUL BERGER, 
FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDER’S DESIGN 77-99 (1987); CHARLES J. BLOCH, STATES’ RIGHTS: THE 
LAW OF THE LAND 31-33 (1958); STEVENSON, supra note 1, at 37-57.  
15The present vitality of limited powers doctrine has been amply explored in the literature.  
See, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, THE IMPLOSION OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 15-30 (2001) (chapter 
entitled “The Futile Idea of Limited Powers”).  For an interesting comparative review of this 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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sovereignty, so one may be viewed as the inverse of the other.  Otherwise stated, 
federal and state sovereignty together sum the whole of governmental power. 
Supervening in this arrangement are the limitations on governmental power 
imposed by declarations of rights, namely the Bill of Rights and analogous 
declarations in state constitutions.16  The free expression guarantee of the First 
Amendment in particular is phrased as a limitation on governmental power: 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or 
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
redress of grievances.”17  Subsequently extended pursuant to the Fourteenth 
Amendment to limit state as well as federal power,18 this “negative” phrasing of the 
First Amendment is significant because it represents no affirmative grant of power to 
the government.19  Congress may not rely on the First Amendment alone to authorize 
legislation not otherwise “necessary and proper” to further Article I objectives. 
Not all declarations of rights, and not all free expression guarantees, are phrased 
in the negative.  For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights declares, “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression . . . .”20  The 
American Convention on Human Rights mirrors the language of the ICCPR.21  
Interestingly, the American Convention further provides that “[t]he right of 
expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of 
government or private controls . . . tending to impede the communication and 
circulation of ideas and opinions.”22  Thus a signatory government might rely on the 
                                                          
federalist division of power in the modern age, see generally CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, 
STATES’ RIGHTS UNDER FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONS (1984). 
16For a review of the origin, scope, and interpretational theory of state constitutional law, 
see generally Developments in the Law—The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 
HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1326-67 (1982); see also WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS 63-98 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1980) (describing emergence of first state 
constitutions).  For a similar explication of specifically state freedom of expression guarantees, 
see Todd F. Simon, Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection of 
Freedom of Expression, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 305, 309-20 (1985). 
17U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
18Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
19The Fourteenth Amendment of course gives Congress a power of enforcement, U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, but only to ensure that states respect the prohibition of the First 
Amendment. 
20ICCPR art. 19(2); see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 (“Everyone 
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . .”) and art. 20(1) (“Everyone has the 
right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.”). The covenant expressly imposes 
concomitant responsibilities on those who exercise the right.  ICCPR art. 19(3) (requiring that 
persons respect “the rights or reputations of others” and “public order, . . . health or morals”).  
In ratifying the covenant, the United States was careful to declare that the covenant may not be 
read to restrict rights that are already construed more broadly under domestic constitutional 
law. 
21ACHR art. 13(1).  The convention carries a section on responsibilities as well.  See 
ACHR art. 13(2).  But cf. ICCPR art. 19(3).   
22ACHR art. 13(3) (emphasis added). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/4
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convention, if constitutionally executed in domestic law, as an affirmative source of 
power to further free expression interests as against other private interests, such as 
property rights.23 
In the state constitutions, precise language varies, but they tend to a similar 
pattern: first providing affirmatively for a right of free expression, then adding that 
no law may abridge that freedom.24  For example, the New York Constitution states 
that “[e]very citizen may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to 
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”25  The California 
Constitution contains almost identical language, save splitting the two independent 
clauses into separate sentences,26 while the Connecticut Constitution splits the same 
sentiment into separate sections.27 
The Massachusetts Constitution is somewhat more circumspect, declaring first 
that “[t]he liberty of the press is essential to the security of freedom in a state: it 
ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth,” then adding, by 1948 
amendment,28 that “[t]he right of free speech shall not be abridged.”29  The Arizona 
Constitution contains an affirmative statement of free speech rights almost identical 
to that of New York and California, but no negative counterpart. 30  At the same time, 
the Arizona Constitution contains no clearly affirmative statement of the right to 
petition Rather, it contains a negative statement structured similarly to the 
Massachusetts amendment: “The right of petition, and of the people peaceably to 
assemble for the common good, shall never be abridged.”31  Notably, the latter 
negative provisions in Massachusetts and Arizona are phrased in the passive voice—
“never be abridged”—and are unrestricted by any apparent grammatical subject.  
Thus, the state government is not necessarily the only potential actor within the 
scope of the prohibition.  Arguably, these passive voice provisions, though phrased 
negatively, are intended to function affirmatively, because only the power of the 
                                                                
23The extent to which the U. S. Congress might augment its power through treaty 
ratification and enforcement is unclear.  See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433-35 (1920) 
(suggesting that treaty may empower Congress as against state power reserved by the Tenth 
Amendment, but not considering countervailing private interests). 
24Simon, supra note 16, at 314.  The instant study is not strictly limited to free expression 
provisions, rather concerns interpretation of whatever state constitutional provisions are 
invoked in Pruneyard circumstances.  Other state constitutional provisions bear the same 
affirmative-to-negative relationship to their federal counterparts, while some state 
constitutional provisions affirmatively establish individual or electoral rights without clear 
federal analogs. 
25N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
26CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
27CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 4-5. 
28MASS. CONST. amend. art. LXXVII. 
29MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI. 
30ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 6 (“Every person may freely speak, write, and publish on all 
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”). 
31ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 5. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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state can restrain private non-speech interests, such as the exclusive enjoyment of 
private property, from abridging private speech interests, such as picketing. 
These distinctions in state law are potentially significant.  Constrained by both 
the enumerated power provisions and the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, the 
federal government is bound to respect citizens’ free expression rights as against 
government power, but has no independent authority to shield or further citizens’ 
free expression rights as against other citizens’ legal interests.  That latter power is 
reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment.  Because federal sovereignty was 
carved out of state sovereignty, the states presumably retain broad powers of 
governance, limited in turn by their state constitutions.  Insofar as a state constitution 
imposes limitations akin to those of the federal Constitution, state powers are 
similarly limited.  But insofar as a state constitution imposes no limitations, rather 
asserts affirmative citizen rights, the state may claim the ability, if not the 
responsibility, to protect and further those citizen rights as against other legal 
interests of citizens. 
B.  The State Action Requirement 
This legal background sets the stage for the problem that arises when citizens 
claim constitutional rights, namely the right to free expression, or concomitant rights 
to participate in the political process, as against private, or non-state, actors.  Under 
the federal Constitution, these claims are usually doomed by the “state action” 
requirement.32  In other words, absent express constitutional authority or a federal 
statute “necessary and proper” to further enumerated constitutional powers, the 
federal courts have no basis upon which to enforce one citizen’s constitutional rights 
against the legal interests of another.33  The state governments are not so constrained.  
They may seize upon an affirmative constitutional guarantee to secure citizen rights 
as against contrary private interests,34 up to the point that the adverse party has a 
countervailing constitutional interest, such as the right against deprivation of 
property without due process of law.35  Upon this theory, the Supreme Court 
recognized in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins that a state may construe its 
                                                                
32For a history of the state action requirement and a call for its reexamination, see Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985).  Professor Chemerinsky 
bemoaned the rapid decline in interest in the state action doctrine from the 1950s and 1960s to 
1980, but his call for a resurgence has gone largely unheeded. Id. at 503.  Similarly, a reliable 
stream of literature on the promise of state constitutional law to continue the momentum of 
civil rights development dissipated substantially after the mid-1980s, with few noteworthy 
works defying the dearth.  See, e.g., sources cited infra note 66; Berger, infra note 52. 
33Shelley v. Kraemer inaugurated a famously broad interpretation of state action under the 
civil rights laws, which are justified with reference to the enforcement authority granted to 
Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment.  334 U.S. 1 (1948).  There may be other, more 
limited exceptions.  See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (compelling company town 
to respect religious freedom). 
34See Simon, supra note 16, at 311 (“The first amendment . . . provid[ed] a clear 
prohibition that worked only against government; the majority of state provisions were and 
still are affirmative grants of personal freedom that act against individuals as well as against 
government.”). 
35U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol53/iss3/4
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state constitutional provisions as broader—that is, providing more protection—than 
the federal Constitution.36 
Pruneyard arose specifically in the context of private citizens engaged in 
expressive activity—high school students gathering petition signatures—in a 
privately owned shopping center during hours when the property was held open to 
the general public.  The central question—whether those constitutional rights should 
be enforceable as against private property interests—has had a peculiar history 
before the U. S. Supreme Court.37 
The Court initially opened the door for civil liberties to intrude upon private 
property in the “company town” case of Marsh v. Alabama.38  Where the privately 
held Gulf Shipbuilding Corporation owned the very storefronts, sidewalks, streets, 
and sewers of a Mobile, Alabama, suburb, and employed the town sheriff, the Court 
in 1946 reversed the trespass conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness distributing religious 
literature.39  Thus, on private property that was functionally equivalent and 
apparently indistinguishable from public property, the Court found it appropriate to 
balance residents’ rights against the owner’s property interests, concluding that the 
former “occupy a preferred position.”40  The Court expanded the doctrine in 1968 in 
Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., by 
allowing union activists to picket peacefully in the parcel pick-up area and parking 
lot outside a store in Logan Valley Plaza, a privately held shopping center.41  The 
Court found the shopping center to be the “functional equivalent” of the business 
district in Marsh.42   
But only four years after Logan Valley, the Court backed off.  In Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, Vietnam War protestors sought to handbill in a shopping center, and the 
Court sided with the shopping center.43  The Court distinguished Logan Valley on 
grounds that the subject of the demonstration in that case was related to the store 
outside of which the demonstration occurred, whereas the antiwar demonstration in 
Lloyd was unrelated to the retail purpose of the shopping center.44  That content-
                                                                
36
 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980); e.g., Simon, supra note 16, at 313 (“It is axiomatic . . . that a 
state may grant greater rights than required by the federal minimum.”).  This proposition has 
been amply explored in the literature.  See, e.g., Developments in the Law, supra note 16, at 
1367-1502; William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 
90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Barry A. Spevack, Note, Expanding State Constitutional 
Protections and the New Silver Platter: After They’ve Shut the Door, Can They Bar the 
Window?, 8 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 186 (1976). 
37This history has been amply recounted.  See, e.g., William Barnett, Note, A Private Mall 
Becomes a Public Hall, 26 LOY. L. REV. 739 (1980). 
38326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
39Id. at 502, 509. 
40Id. at 509. 
41Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 
308 (1968). 
42Id. at 318. 
43Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972). 
44Id. at 560-63. 
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based distinction did not withstand the test of time, though.  Another four years later, 
in Hudgens v. NLRB, the Court plainly held that Logan Valley had been overruled, 
and bluntly applied the state action requirement to control in such situations 
subsequently.45 
Nevertheless, the Court in Lloyd left the door cracked for modest state 
intervention to regulate speech and property, to find the proper balance between both 
interests, provided First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights are respected all 
around.46  California took up the charge, and in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robins,47 the Court was charged with deciding whether the state had drawn the 
balance within the constitutionally permissible range.  In Pruneyard, high school 
students had set up a table at a California mall to collect signatures in “opposition to 
a United Nations resolution against ‘Zionism.’”48  Thus, as in Lloyd, the expressive 
activity was unrelated to the commercial function of the shopping center.  
Recognizing that the federal First Amendment would not protect the students on 
private property, the California Supreme Court extended the protection of its state 
free speech and petition clauses.49  The court surely anticipated a federal appeal; 
dissenting Justice Richardson lamented the subordination of “private property rights” 
to “‘free speech’ claims.”50  But the U.S. Supreme Court found no impermissible 
transgression against the mall owners’ Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment interests.  
Though the Court recognized that “there ha[d] literally been a ‘taking,’” it was not 
the sort of unreasonable infringement of constitutional proportion that requires 
compensation.51   
Pruneyard has been amply criticized as an activist interpretation of the California 
Constitution, and the case has not yielded a majority rule among the states.52  For 
example, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found it “significant that the majority [in 
Pruneyard] did not analyze the constitutional sections.  It appears to be more a 
decision of desire rather than analytical conviction.  As the dissent in [Pruneyard] 
points out, the majority ignored entirely findings of fact and conclusions of law of 
the trial court which would effect a contrary result by the majority.”53  The Court of 
Appeals of New York observed that Pruneyard—a 4-3 decision with “not much 
analysis and only tangential discussion, if it can be called that, of the State action 
                                                                
45Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
46See Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569-70. 
47
 447 U.S. 74  
48Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341, 342 (Cal. 1979). 
49Id. at 347. 
50Id. at 348. 
51Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 82-84. 
52But see Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 633 (1991).  Professor Berger proposes a model statute for legislative 
recognition of Pruneyard principles.  See id. at 692-94. 
53Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832, 841 (Wis. 1987). 
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question”—overruled California precedent only five years older54 and thus attributed 
the later ruling to an “‘accident of a change of personalities in the Judges of [the] 
court,’ which this court has correctly condemned as ‘a shallow basis for 
jurisprudential evolution.’”55 
State court decisions that subsequently contemplated the same question of 
expressive activity at private-property shopping centers are compiled in an American 
Law Reports Annotation by attorney Harriet Dinegar Milks.56  According to the 
Annotation as updated through 2002, three-quarters of state judiciaries to consider 
the question have reached a contrary conclusion to that in Pruneyard.  Colorado, 
Massachusetts, and New Jersey have followed the California example,57 while 
Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan,58 New York, North Carolina, Ohio, 
Oregon,59 Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have disagreed with the 
California position.60  Not included in these counts of four and twelve is Washington, 
which straddles the fence, depending on specifically which of its constitutional 
provisions is at stake—though the Washington Supreme Court’s more recent anti-
Pruneyard majority ruling seems weightier than its plurality-authored predecessor.61 
III.  INQUIRIES AND FINDINGS: TWO QUESTIONS, FEW ANSWERS 
The dichotomy of state views on this subject offers an opportunity to study the 
interpretivist modes that state courts employ to construe their constitutional 
                                                                
54SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211, 1214 n.5 (N.Y. 1985) (citing 
Diamond v. Bland, 521 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1974)). 
55SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1214 n.5 (quoting People v. Hobson, 348 N.E.2d 894 
(N.Y. 1976)). 
56Harriet Dinegar Milks, Annotation, Validity, Under State Constitutions, of Private 
Shopping Center’s Prohibition or Regulation of Political, Social, or Religious Expression or 
Activity, 52 A.L.R.5th 195 (1997) (subsequently updated). 
57See id. § 3. 
58For a review of state action in Michigan constitutional law prior to final decision in the 
case here studied, see generally Elizabeth Hardy, Note, Post-Pruneyard Access to Michigan 
Shopping Centers: The “Malling” of Constitutional Rights, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 93 (1983). 
59The decision in Oregon represents an about-face.  See Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 
P.3d 228, 243 (Or. 2000), overruling Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 849 P.2d 446 (Or. 1993).  Citing 
only the intermediate appellate disposition of Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 958 P.2d 854 
(Or. Ct. App. 1998), which was consistent with the previously announced rule of Whiffen, the 
Milks Annotation fails to recognize the 2000 overruling.  See Milks, supra note 56, §§ 3-4.  
This omission cannot be explained as other than a substantive oversight; therefore, the latter, 
authoritative decision in Stranahan will be considered here to the exclusion of its 
predecessors. 
60See Milks, supra note 56, § 4. 
61Compare Southcenter Joint Venture v. Nat’l Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282 
(Wash. 1989), with Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981) 
(plurality).  The term “anti-Pruneyard” will be used henceforth to indicate a rejection of the 
argument to expand state constitutional liberty and should not be confused with the assertion 
that Pruneyard itself was wrongly decided. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
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provisions when ordinarily supreme federal law is settled and not encumbering.62  
All of the cases in the Milks Annotation are highly analogous factually, involving 
individual or small-group expressive activity in private shopping centers during 
hours when they are held open to the public.  Thus, facts are narrowly constrained to 
as nearly a constant as possible in cross-jurisdictional empirical research.  The legal 
provisions at stake in the various state constitutions differ in their particulars—such 
as text and legislative history—but are all of a kind in that they represent the express 
and measured preservation of individual liberty in the context of a modern 
democratic government with an independent judiciary.  Thus, the interpretivist 
modes, or analytical methods, through which each court approaches the same legal 
problem on the same facts are comparable. 
Using the shopping center factual context and the pool of case law suggested by 
the Milks Annotation,63 two questions are considered here.  First, when did state 
courts find affirmative state constitutional language significant, and thus a basis to 
distinguish textually the federal Constitution and augment state governmental power 
to further individual liberty interests as against competing rights?  In other words, 
when did textualism matter?  This analysis reveals that generally, state courts that 
choose to augment state power to advance liberty interests find distinguishing 
textualist arguments highly persuasive, while courts that decline to augment such 
state power either reject textualism outright or stretch textualist arguments to serve 
the courts’ conclusions.  Interestingly, there is little or no correlation between the 
value a court places on textual distinctions, and the affirmative or negative language 
of the subject constitutional texts, suggesting that textualism is not objectively a 
useful predictive tool, rather a rationale of convenience that a court may embrace or 
reject depending on the desired outcome. 
                                                                
62Professor Simon in 1985 researched disparate freedom of expression doctrines according 
to state constitutional law. Simon, supra note 16, at 320-37.  The Simon study was not limited 
to Pruneyard-type activity or individual rights vis-à-vis private interests, but did emphasize 
media concerns (libel, reporter privilege, open courts, and other issues, besides the Pruneyard 
problem).  Professor Simon classified state court reasoning with three approaches:  The 
“reactive” decision arises from state court disagreement with federal doctrine.  The “primacy” 
decision construes state law to the exclusion of federal law except in event of conflict.  And 
the “interstitial” decision fills gaps in federal doctrine.  Id. at 315-17.  “From among these 
groups no clear method emerge[d].”  Id. at 337.  Moreover, Professor Simon unmasked “no 
absolutists, no social philosophers, no insistent balancers, and few legal historians attempting 
to resolve free expression issues at the state level.”  Id. (footnotes omitted). 
The author is unaware of any other prior empirical research since Pruneyard, though of 
course there have been many case notes and comments.  E.g., Jon A. Mueller, Comment, 
Transforming the Privately Owned Shopping Center Into a Public Forum, 15 U. RICH. L. REV. 
699 (1981).  For an inquiry prior to Pruneyard—and one considerably more thorough than this 
study in that it surveys all state constitutional variations without limitation by case facts or 
subject matter—see David J. Fine, et. al, Project Report, Toward an Activist Role for State 
Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. REV. 271 (1973) (with state-by-state appendix at 322-50); 
see also discussion of Fine, et al., infra note 66. 
63Some deviations from the Milks Annotation, supra note 56, are here indulged, and 
explanations are proffered to support those deviations.  See, e.g., supra note 59 (explaining 
disregard for Oregon authority cited in Annotation).  The consistent intent underlying the 
methodology is to capture accurately the authoritative rationales operating in each of the 17 
cited jurisdictions.  To this end, and to simplify the analysis, minority opinions are not treated. 
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Second, if not textualism, what interpretivist modes64 do state courts employ in 
construing state constitutional provisions, or what non-interpretivist policies do the 
courts profess to honor?  None of the post-textualist interpretivist modes emerged as 
dominant, though a current of originalism ran through about half the decisions.  For 
the anti-Pruneyard decisions, when originalism was employed, it was regarded as 
controlling.65  Structuralism—specifically the horizontal separation of powers 
between judiciary and legislature—also was important, but most often appeared in a 
supportive, not controlling, role.  As to precedentialism, trends in state-domestic case 
law were the most effective predictors of courts’ conclusions, though the courts did 
not advance precedentialism as a controlling mode of analysis.  At the same time, 
trends in other states’ (foreign) case law were rejected as often as embraced. 
Non-interpretivist public policy arguments tended to follow textualism in that 
they were embraced only by the minority of courts that employed textualism to 
augment state power in the name of liberty interests.  Courts that declined to 
augment state power tended to place little or no weight on public policy arguments, 
if the arguments were recognized at all. 
These findings offer few viable generalizations, which might indicate that a legal 
realist would be a better predictor of expansive construction of a state constitution 
than an interpretivist or public policy advocate.66  One can conclude that originalism, 
                                                                
64This study considers the interpretivist modes of textualism, originalism, structuralism, 
and precedentialism (both state-domestic and state-foreign). These are “the main interpretive 
strategies that have become prevalent.”  Robert J. Pushaw, Method of Interpreting the 
Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1187 (2003); see also, 
e.g., Ryan E. Mick, Justifications for a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Deference to the 
States’ Moral Judgments, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 379, 382-90 (2003) (treating textualism, 
structuralism, and originalism).  Each of these modes will be given the barest of definition 
here, full expositions being well beyond the scope of this work.  For more detail, see 
generally, Pushaw, supra, at 1187-1206, and Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International 
Tribunals, and the Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 675, 774 n.364 (citing PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3-119 (1982); ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)). 
65Original intent has long been regarded as supreme, even over textualism.  See, e.g., 
BERGER, supra note 14, at 15-16 (“That canon of construction is centuries old, as the Court 
itself has point out, saying, ‘The intention of the lawmaker is the law,’ rising even above the 
text.” (quoting Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903) (citing MATTHEW BACON, A 
NEW ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND, Statute I(5) (3d ed. 1768)))). 
66Cf. Simon, supra note 16, at 338 (disapproving, generally, of trend in state court 
activism for “depressing lack of uniformity” in resulting doctrines); Steven M. Kamp, Note, 
Private Abridgment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165 (1980) 
(advocating state constitutional protections); Fine et al., supra note 62; Vern Countryman, 
Why a State Bill of Rights?, 45 WASH. L. REV. 454, 485 (1970) (“It is scarcely possible to 
exaggerate the importance of the role to be played by the state Bill of Rights during the next 
100 years.”); Robert Force, State “Bills of Rights”: A Case of Neglect and the Need for a 
Renaissance, 3 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 125 (1969); Monrad G. Paulsen, State Constitutions, 
State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620 (1951) (“State court 
decisions and state constitutional materials are too frequently ignored by both commentator 
and counsel when civil liberties questions arise.”). 
Fine et al., in 1973, thus before the Pruneyard era, offered four points of advice to 
advocates of expanded state constitutional interests: (1) rely on textualism, (2) rely on foreign 
precedentialism, (3) consider questions left open in existing federal constitutional doctrine, 
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structuralism, and domestic precedent are most likely to play a role in a court’s 
decision, so advocates for either position on state constitution litigation should be 
prepared to advance their positions using these interpretivist modes.  Textualism, 
especially when backed up by public policy, is the better tool of the advocate for 
expansive state constitutional construction; if the court decides the question to the 
contrary, textualism and public policy will not likely play supportive roles.  
Meanwhile, foreign precedent seems to bear dubious value no matter for which 
position one wishes to advocate.  Though courts considering the Pruneyard question 
were likely to contemplate foreign precedent, it proved less than enduring. 
IV.  METHOD AND ANALYSIS: EIGHTEEN OPINIONS  
AND SIX MODES OF ARGUMENT 
Arguments appearing in the eighteen court opinions studied, whether arguments 
that supported the courts’ conclusions or arguments that were rejected, were 
classified according to interpretivist mode, or as public policy arguments.  The 
modes observed were textualism, originalism, structuralism, and domestic and 
foreign precedentialism.67  At the outset of each of the following subsections, each 
term is defined in the context of this research.68  Naturally, this classification scheme 
could not be imposed rigidly on the vagaries of legal reasoning and writing.  An 
effort was made to distinguish distinct legal arguments according to the dominant 
nature of each, and only arguments that clearly operated under multiple 
classifications were cross-listed.  The analysis begins with textualism, in an effort to 
determine when, or whether, the textual distinctions in state constitutional terms 
controlled the courts’ decisions.  The analysis then moves to other interpretivist 
modes and non-interpretivist public policy to determine what arguments, if not 
textualist arguments, animated decisions.  Data points are presented in the Table, 
represented by pinpoint page numbers. 
 
 
                                                          
and (4) rely on novel provisions of state constitutional law that lack federal counterparts.  Fine 
et. al, supra note 62, at 315-19.  Because the instant study is limited to a review of analytical 
modes, the latter two points exceed the scope of this inquiry.  This study does bolster the first 
point of Fine for the advocate of expansive construction, but also shows that courts disinclined 
to such construction are willing to reject textualism.  To Fine’s credit, their discussion of 
textualism (“linguistic variation”) includes originalism, which may have merit for advocates 
on both sides. See id. at 315-16.  Unfortunately for Fine, as to their second point, the instant 
study shows that courts are willing to reject foreign precedent when they find it disagreeable—
though granted, it remains a worthy point for the advocate to address, as it has proven of 
interest to the courts.  Of course, these observations and criticisms of Fine, are limited to the 
Pruneyard fact scenario, the focus of this study, and might not be valid in light of 
developments in other areas of state constitutional law, such as the broad range Fine studied, 
including, for example, cruel and unusual punishment, and search and seizure. 
67The term “precedentialism” is taken from Pushaw, supra note 64.  The term appears as 
well in Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 
(1995). 
68
 See supra text accompanying note 64. 
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     Mode 
 
 
Case 
Textualism Originalism Structuralism Domestic 
Precedent 
Foreign 
Precedent 
Public 
Policy 
Robins,  
592 P2d 341 
(Cal 1979) 
346 346  346-37  347 
Alderwood,  
635 P2d 108 
(Wash 1981) 
(plural) 
114 
 
 
 113 113 115 116 
Batchelder,  
445 NE2d 590 
(Mass 1983) 
593    594 595 
Bock,  
819 P2d 55 
(Colo 1991) 
58-59 60  59-60  62 
JMB,  
650 A2d 757 
(NJ 1994) 
[Schmid, 423 
A2d (1980)] 
[626 & n.8, 
627-28 
(mixed)] 
[628]  760-61  
[625-26] 
769-70 761,  
766-67, 
772-75 
[627] 
Felmet,  
273 SE2d 708 
(NC 1981) 
      
Cologne,  
469 A2d 1201 
(Conn 1984) 
1208-09 
(rejected) 
1208 1209-10   1209 
(rejected) 
Woodland,  
378 NW2d 337 
(Mich 1985) 
(e’banc) 
344-45 
(rejected) 
346,  
348-50 
344,  
346-47,  
357-58 
344-45 357 
(mixed) 
353, 
358 
(rejected) 
SHAD,  
488 NE2d 1211  
(NY 1985) 
1214 
(rejected) 
1214 1216-17 1215 1214 1216 
(rejected) 
W. Pa,  
515 A2d 1331 
(Pa 1986) 
1334    1338-39 
(mixed) 
1336 
(rejected) 
Jacobs,  
407 NW2d 832 
(Wis 1987) 
836, 839-
40 
837, 841 840 838-39 841-44 
(mixed) 
845 
Fiesta,  
767 P2d 719 
(Ariz App 1988) 
721 
(rejected) 
   722-23 724 
Southcenter, 780 
P2d 1282 (Wash 
1989) 
1287-88 
(rejected) 
1287-88 1288  1289 1290-92 
(rejected) 
Citizens,  
392 SE2d 8 
(Ga 1990) 
    9-10 9 
(rejected) 
Charleston,  
417 SE2d 544  
(SC 1992) 
      
Eastwood,  
626 NE2d 59 
(Ohio 1994) 
61   61 61  
Stranahan,  
11 P3d 228   
(Or 2000) 
239-42 243  242-43   
Engler,  
641 NW2d 803 
(Iowa 2002) 
805-06 
(rejected) 
   805 806 
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A.  Textualism 
Textualism, also called “strict constructionism,” is “[t]he doctrinal view of 
judicial construction holding that judges should interpret a document or statute . . . 
according to its literal terms, without looking to other sources to ascertain the 
meaning.”69  Textualism is appealing because it does not require debate about the 
weight to be accorded competing contextual factors, such as the intentions of 
multiple authors or the understandings of historical readers.  At the same time, 
textualism may be criticized for failing to account for context beyond the four 
corners of the document.  Textualism is typically the first tool employed by the 
interpretivist, who resorts to other interpretivist tools only when the meaning of a 
text is not plain on its face.  Of course, plain meaning is often a matter of 
perspective, providing ample wiggle room for interpretivist or activist construction. 
The constitutional provisions at issue in the cases vary in the affirmative and 
negative nature of their guarantees, in comparison with or in contrast to the First 
Amendment’s negative statement, “Congress shall make no law . . . .”  One might 
therefore expect that textualist analysis would reflect these variations.  But generally, 
the state courts employed textualism only when it served to distinguish the federal 
Constitution and expand state constitutional rights.  Courts construing their state-
protected rights in accordance with the federal Constitution tended to reject 
textualism. 
All five of the jurisdictions that expanded state constitutional rights on behalf of 
activists in shopping centers—California, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Colorado, and 
Washington—asserted textualist justifications.  The constitutions of California, 
Colorado, and New Jersey contain both affirmative and negative free speech and 
                                                                
69BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1434 (7th ed. 1999).  There is ample literature on textualism 
in a variety of contexts.  Though textualism is discussed—and usually disparaged—primarily 
as a tool of statutory interpretation, much of the literature nonetheless considers specifically 
constitutional textualism, or regards textualism sufficiently broadly as to describe 
constitutional textualism.  See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Textualism and War Powers, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1543 (2002); Nancie G. Marzulla, The Textualism of Clarence Thomas: 
Anchoring the Supreme Court’s Property Rights Jurisprudence to the Constitution, 10 AM. U. 
J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 351 (2002); John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees 
Constitutional?: Radical Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 489 (2001); Paul E. McGreal, There Is No Such Thing as Textualism: A 
Case Study in Constitutional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2393 (2001) (emphasizing 
textualism, “constitutional law’s Loch Ness monster,” as a non-exclusive tool); Joel K. 
Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeachment Trial?: A Critique of 
Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849 (2000); Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling 
Textualism and Federalism: The Proper Textual Basis of the Supreme Court’s Tenth and 
Eleventh Amendment Decisions, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 819 (1999); Symposium: Textualism and 
the Constitution, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1081 (1998); George H. Taylor, Structural 
Textualism, 75 B.U. L. REV. 321 (1995); Bryan H. Wildenthal, The Right of Confrontation, 
Justice Scalia, and the Power and Limits of Textualism, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1323 (1991); 
Mark V. Tushnet, Comment, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 
S. CAL. L. REV. 683 (1985).  See generally, ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW: AN ESSAY (1997); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHOICES (1985). 
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press provisions.  Apparently construing the affirmative provision, the California 
Supreme Court wrote that the framers of the state constitution deliberately chose not 
to “adopt[] the words of the federal Bill of Rights.”70  The Colorado court similarly 
observed that its affirmative clause “advances beyond the negative command” of its 
federal counterpart, thus distinguishing the Colorado Constitution from the First 
Amendment.71 
The New Jersey Constitution contains provisions almost identical to those of 
California,72 and the New Jersey Supreme Court observed that the affirmative 
language makes New Jersey’s free expression guarantee “more sweeping in scope 
than the language of the First Amendment.”73  But the New Jersey court also took on 
its negative clause.  Rejecting textualism amid its very endorsement, the court stated 
that identical language in state and federal constitutions does not demand like 
construction.74  Quoting a pre-Pruneyard California Supreme Court decision, the 
court noted that “[t]he lesson of history is otherwise: the [federal] Bill of Rights was 
based upon the corresponding provisions of the first state constitutions, rather than 
the reverse.”75  The New Jersey court went so far as to suggest that even constrained 
by a negative provision, the legislature might be compelled to legislate in furtherance 
of free speech, “as the Legislature cannot abridge constitutional rights by its 
enactments [nor] curtail them through its silence.”76 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found no need to reach its free speech 
and petition provisions—the latter plainly affirmative77 and the former negative, but 
                                                                
70Robins, 592 P.2d at 346 (construing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Every person may freely 
speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse 
of this right.  A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”)), aff’d, 447 U.S. 
74 (1980).  The statement is at once a comment on textualism and originalism, reflecting the 
fact that textualism is rarely used to the exclusion of other analytical modes. 
71Bock v. Westminster Mall Co., 819 P.2d 55, 58 (Colo. 1991) (construing COLO. CONST. 
art. II, § 10 (“No law shall be passed impairing the freedom of speech; every person shall be 
free to speak, write or publish whatever he will on any subject, being responsible for the abuse 
of that liberty . . . .”)). 
72N.J. CONST. art. I, ¶ 6 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments 
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.  No law shall be passed to restrain 
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”). 
73New Jersey v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626, 628 (N.J. 1980).  This case on its own facts is 
outside the scope of this study, because it involved trespass on private university property, not 
on shopping center property.  However, the later New Jersey case involving shopping center 
property incorporated Schmid by reference.  N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. 
JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 760-61, 770 (N.J. 1994).  The incorporation of Schmid is so 
thorough and essential to the holding in JMB Realty that it is impossible to understand the 
JMB Realty court’s reasoning without Schmid.  A deviation from the methodology is therefore 
tolerated here. 
74Schmid, 423 A.2d at 625-27. 
75Id. at 626 n.8 (quoting California v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975)). 
76Id. at 627 (quoting King v. S. Jersey Nat’l Bank, 330 A.2d 1, 10 (N.J. 1974)). 
77MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIX (“The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable 
manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good; give instructions to their 
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passive and unrestricted, i.e., with no suppressed subject (“shall not be 
abridged”)78—because the court protected a candidate’s signature-gathering as a 
ballot access right.79  The operative article 9 of the Massachusetts Declaration of 
Rights begins simply, “All elections ought to be free,” and goes on to guarantee to 
“all inhabitants of the Commonwealth . . . an equal right to elect officers, and to be 
elected, for public employments.”80  Nevertheless, discussing the Declaration of 
Rights generally, not just article 9, the court determined that the use of affirmative 
language “is significant” and “reject[ed] any suggestion that the Declaration of 
Rights should be read as directed exclusively toward restraining Government 
action.”81  That determination served as the basis for rejecting a state action 
requirement for article 9.82 
Textualism was at first embraced and then rejected in Washington.  Extending 
the state constitution to protect environmentalist signature-gathering on shopping 
center property, a supreme court plurality relied on the speech and initiative 
provisions of the state constitution.83  Both provisions in Washington are 
affirmative,84 with no negative counterparts, and this resemblance to the affirmative 
language at issue in California and New Jersey was instrumental in reaching the 
plurality’s conclusion.85  Eight years later, however, a supreme court majority 
rejected textualism as impermissibly contravening originalism:  
It is a 2-foot leap across a 10-foot ditch . . . to seize upon the absence of a 
reference to the State as the actor limited by the state free speech 
provision and conclude therefrom that the framers of our state constitution 
intended to create a bold new right that conflicts with the fundamental 
                                                          
representatives, and to request of the legislative body, by way of addresses, petitions, or 
remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer.”). 
78MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XVI (“The liberty of the press is essential to the security of 
freedom in a state: it ought not, therefore, to be restrained in this commonwealth.  The right of 
free speech shall not be abridged.”).  The latter sentence of this article was added by 
amendment in 1948.  MASS. CONST. amend. LXXVII. 
79Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int’l, Inc., 445 N.E.2d 590, 593 & n.8, 595 & n.11 (Mass. 
1983).  The court suggested that state action might not be required under the free speech 
clause, but declined the question.  Id. at 593 n.8. 
80MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. IX. 
81Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at 593. 
82Id. at 593-94. 
83Alderwood Assocs. v. Wash. Envtl. Council, 635 P.2d 108 (Wash. 1981) (construing 
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right.”), amend. VII (reserving the power of initiative to 
the people)). 
84For a discussion regarding the initiative power reserved to the people by Washington 
Constitution amendment 7, see WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“[T]he people reserve to themselves 
the power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls, independent of the 
legislature . . . .”). 
85Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 114-15. 
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premise on which the entire constitution is based.  To do so would not be 
to “interpret” our constitution, but to deny its very nature. 
The much more likely and reasonable explanation for the absence of the 
words in question is that the framers viewed them as redundant and in the 
interest of simplicity simply deleted them.86 
The court further speculated that the framers might have departed from the 
language of the First Amendment (“Congress shall make no law”) to clarify that the 
provision restrained all state government, not just the legislature.87  Nevertheless, the 
court let stand the earlier plurality conclusion, resting it solely on the initiative 
provision.  “[U]nlike the free speech provision,” the court reasoned, “the initiative 
provision is not part of our state constitution’s Declaration of Rights and does not 
establish a right against the government but declares that the people are part of the 
legislative process.”88 
Of the dozen states that rejected pleas for state constitutional protection of 
expressive activity in shopping centers, barely three—Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and 
arguably Ohio—clearly relied on textualist rationales in reaching conclusions 
contrary to those of California, et al.  Oregon seemed receptive to textualist analysis, 
but so narrowed its level of abstraction as to discover “silence” on the state action 
question.89  An affirmative reservation to the people of the initiative and referendum 
power in that state90 said nothing about how signatures should be gathered, 
propelling the court into other interpretivist modes.91 
Pennsylvania’s Constitution contains plainly affirmative guarantees of free 
expression and petition.92  But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court viewed the 
provisions not in and of themselves, rather in the context of the entire document: a 
change in the level of textualist abstraction bolstered by originalist interpretation.93  
                                                                
86Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1287-88. 
87Id. at 1288.  “Textualistically” speaking, the elimination of an actor altogether hardly 
clarified the question of what actor is restrained. 
88Id. at 1289 (citing Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d 108, 120-21 (Dolliver, J., concurring)). 
89Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 11 P.3d 228 (Or. 2000). 
90OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
91Stranahan, 11 P.3d at 239-41. 
92PA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“The free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the 
invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject, 
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”); id. § 20 (“The citizens have a right in a 
peaceable manner to assemble together for their common good, and to apply to those invested 
with the powers of government for redress of grievances or other proper purposes, by petition, 
address or remonstrance.”).  Section 7 further contains a negative statement on legislative 
interference with the use of a printing press specifically “to examine the proceedings of the 
Legislature or any branch of government[.]” Id. § 7. 
93W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331, 
1334 (Pa. 1986).  The contextual inquiry may be described as structural textualism, involving 
the structure of a document, a concept apart from structuralism, involving the structure of the 
governmental system a document describes.  Id. 
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At this broader level of abstraction, the court acknowledged that in the state’s 1776 
constitution, civil liberties were stated in a second part of the document, apart from 
governmental powers in the first; the second part was designed to serve as a 
limitation on the first.94  Thus, the textual design demonstrated a state action 
requirement in otherwise uncompromising affirmative statements of rights.95   
In a methodically interpretivist approach to its state constitution, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court began with “plain meaning”96 and found that mixed affirmative and 
negative clauses97 could not reasonably be misunderstood to create other than a right 
against state action.98  The court perceived the latter negative clause as defining the 
contours of the former, affirmative clause, rather than viewing the affirmative clause 
as a separate statement with independent meaning.99  Ohio seemed to reach a similar 
result in construing its mixed clauses100 when it concluded, with little additional 
elaboration, that “the plain language . . . when read in its entirety,” contains a state 
action requirement.101 
Courts in Michigan, Connecticut, Arizona, Iowa, and New York rejected 
textualist analyses for state rights unfettered by a state action requirement.  Iowa and 
New York, both with mixed affirmative/negative provisions,102 did not clearly 
employ textualist analyses, but followed Michigan and Connecticut, respectively, in 
rejecting textualist distinctions.103  The Arizona Court of Appeals implicitly rejected 
                                                                
94Id. at 1335. 
95Id. 
96Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d  at 836. 
97WIS. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments 
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right, and no laws shall be passed to 
restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”). 
98Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 837.  The court did concede that “[w]hether language of a statute 
or constitutional provision is clear or ambiguous depends on the mind-set of the reader,” but 
proceeded on its own “mind-set,” observing that of alternative reasonable interpretations, one 
might be the only “correct” interpretation.  Id.  
99Id. 
100OHIO CONST. art. I, § 11 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of the right; and no law shall be 
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.”). 
101Eastwood Mall, Inc. v. Slanco, 626 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ohio 1994) (emphasis added). 
102IOWA CONST. art. I, § 7 (“Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on 
all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right. No law shall be passed to restrain or 
abridge the liberty of speech, or of the press.”); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“Every citizen may 
freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the 
abuse of that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of 
the press.”). 
103City of W. Des Moines v. Engler, 641 N.W.2d 803, 806 (Iowa 2002) (following 
Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 344, 346); SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1214 (following Cologne 
v. Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201, 1207-08 (Conn. 1984)). 
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textualism in not responding directly to a litigant’s textualist arguments104 based on 
an affirmative free speech provision and a negative, but passive voice and 
unrestricted, free petition provision.105  Meanwhile the courts in Michigan and 
Connecticut were unequivocal in their rejection of textualism.  The Michigan 
Supreme Court ruled specifically that there is no “significant” distinction in 
affirmative and negative language choices, observing that the court had previously 
construed Michigan constitutional text differently from the construction given to 
identical text in the federal Constitution.106  Thus, the affirmative language of the 
Michigan petition guarantee and the mixed language of the free speech clauses107 
were of no importance.  The Connecticut Constitution contains only affirmative 
assertions of free speech and petition rights,108 but the Connecticut Supreme Court 
similarly concluded that affirmative/negative variations were unhelpful in discerning 
the framers’ intent.109 
The Georgia Supreme Court did not address textualism in construing its 
affirmative petition guarantee.110  The North Carolina Supreme Court, asked to 
construe a negative, but passive and unrestricted, free speech provision, declined to 
                                                                
104See Fiesta Mall Ventures v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1988). 
105ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 5 (“The right of petition, of the people to peaceably assemble for 
the common good, shall never be abridged.”); id  § 6 (“Every person may freely speak, write, 
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.”).  The court did 
reason similarly to the Washington Supreme Court, but with a different result, in concluding 
that the reservation of initiative and referendum power to the people did not constitute a 
declaration of right, therefore was subject to a different state action analysis.  Fiesta Mall 
Ventures, 767 P.2d at 724-25 (construing ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1). 
106Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 345. 
107MICH. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The people have the right peaceably to assemble, to consult 
for the common good, to instruct their representatives and to petition the government for 
redress of grievances.”); id. § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write, express and publish 
his views on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such right; and no law shall be 
enacted to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.”). 
108CONN. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his 
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.”);  id. § 14 (The 
citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble for their common good, and to apply 
to those invested with the powers of government, for redress of grievances, or other proper 
purposes, by petition, address or remonstrance.”).   
109Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1208-09. Though finding textual analysis unhelpful in this case, 
the Connecticut court affirmed the importance of “the written document as a shield against the 
arbitrary exercise of governmental power,” stating as follows: “This court has never viewed 
constitutional language as newly descended from the firmament like fresh fallen snow upon 
which jurists may trace out their individual notions of public policy uninhibited by the history 
which attended the adoption of the particular phraseology at issue and the intentions of its 
authors.”  Id. 
110See Citizens for Ethical Gov’t, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 1990) 
(construing GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ 9 (“The people have the right to assemble peaceably for 
their common good and to apply by petition or remonstrance those vested with the powers of 
government for redress of grievances.”)). 
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do so at all.111  And the South Carolina Supreme Court simply declared its free 
expression provision as in harmony with the federal First Amendment;112 indeed the 
language is nearly identical.113 
In sum, textualism only mattered when it mattered; that is to say, generally, the 
few courts that wished to take advantage of affirmative-negative language 
distinctions employed textualism to do so, thus distinguishing their state 
constitutional clauses from the Bill of Rights and augmenting state power to further 
individual liberty interests.  The majority of the courts studied, which chose not to 
expand their state constitutional rights to protect expressive liberties in private 
shopping centers, either rejected outright a distinction between affirmative and 
negative language choices, or stretched textualist doctrine so as to construe 
affirmative language as having only negative effect. 
Interestingly, there was little or no correlation between the value a court placed 
on textual distinctions and the affirmative or negative language of the constitutional 
texts subject to construction.  Of the five constitutional provisions at issue in the 
“expansionist,” or pro-Pruneyard, states, three were mixed, employing both 
affirmative and negative language, and only two were plainly affirmative.  Of the 
thirteen provisions114 that rendered no enhanced state power to further individual 
liberties, only one—South Carolina—was plainly negative, like the federal First 
Amendment.  Four were mixed.  One was passive but unrestricted, and a majority of 
seven were plainly affirmative, thus distinguishable from the federal First 
Amendment on their faces, but to no avail.  Of the three majority jurisdictions that 
explored textualism at all, two were in the “plainly affirmative” camp, and the other, 
Wisconsin, involved mixed language. 
Thus when textualism was employed, it enabled opposing results that could not 
be predicted by reference to the analyzed text.  Courts could take or leave textualism 
regardless of the subject text, but courts that “took” textualism reached expansionist 
results more often than not, in contravention of the majority rule.  One can only 
conclude that textualism is not a reliable or consistent predictor across jurisdictions.   
B.  If Not Textualism, What? 
Originalism is the leading interpretivist tool when plain meaning fails.  In this 
study, it appeared in half of the cases; however, its treatment in the pro-Pruneyard 
cases was thin.  Structuralism—specifically the separation of powers between 
judiciary and legislature—appeared frequently in the anti-Pruneyard camp, but 
                                                                
111North Carolina v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708, 712 (N.C. 1981) (declining to construe N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 14 (“Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of 
liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every person should be held responsible for 
their abuse.”)). 
112Charleston Joint Venture v. McPherson, 417 S.E.2d 544, 548 n.7 (S.C. 1992). 
113Compare S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The General Assembly shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging the freedom 
of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the 
government or any department thereof for a redress of grievances.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. 
I. 
114The reader will recall that Washington counts twice, so there are 17 jurisdictions and 18 
constitutional authorities. 
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hardly at all among pro-Pruneyard cases.  Trends in state domestic case law were the 
most effective predictors of courts’ conclusions.  At the same time, trends in foreign 
precedent were rejected as often as embraced.  Finally, non-interpretivist public 
policy arguments tended to be embraced by the pro-Pruneyard cases and rejected by 
the anti-Pruneyard cases. 
1.  Originalism 
According to the theory of originalism, constitutional language “should be 
interpreted according to the intent of those who drafted and adopted it.”115  
Originalism therefore permits inquiry into circumstantial evidence of drafters’, or 
voters’, intent, just as legislative committee reports and floor debates are indicative 
of statutory intent.   
Originalism was invoked modestly by the court in Pruneyard; the textualist 
assertion that the framers of the California Constitution deliberately chose not to 
“adopt[] the words of the federal Bill of Rights”116 rings simultaneously of 
originalism.  The mode made similarly spare but perceptible appearances in the 
reasoning of the Colorado and New Jersey courts.  The former observed that an 
expansive interpretation of individual rights under the Colorado Constitution was 
consistent with “an opinion issued within a few years after the Colorado Constitution 
was adopted and while its drafting was a living memory.”117  The New Jersey 
Supreme Court observed that an expansive interpretation of its free speech and 
assembly guarantees “comports with the presumed intent of those who framed our 
Constitution.”118  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts and the Washington 
Supreme Court plurality did not rely on originalist arguments. 
Meanwhile, six of the thirteen anti-Pruneyard rulings invoked originalism.  The 
Connecticut court was especially artful in its assertion of originalism as an 
interpretivist mode superior to any analytical approach that would result in activism:  
This court has never viewed constitutional language as newly descended 
from the firmament like fresh fallen snow upon which jurists may trace 
out their individual notions of public policy uninhibited by the history 
which attended the adoption of the particular phraseology at issue and the 
intentions of its authors.  The faith which democratic societies repose in 
the written document as a shield against the arbitrary exercise of 
governmental power would be illusory if those vested with the 
responsibility for construing and applying disputed provisions were free to 
stray from the purposes of the originators.  “If the words have a doubtful 
meaning, or are susceptible of two meanings, they should receive that 
                                                                
115BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (7th ed. 1999).  On the importance of originalism in 
constitutional interpretation, see generally, BERGER, supra note 14, at 3-20. 
116Robins, 592 P.2d at 346. Cf. supra text accompanying note 70.  
117Bock, 819 P.2d at 60 (citing Cooper v. Colo., 22 P. 790 (1889)).  Arguably this phrase 
better represents the theory of “original meaning” than “original intent.”  These two concepts 
are deliberately conflated in this study, as they are arguably conflated even in the Black’s Law 
Dictionary definition of “originalism.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1126 (7th. ed. 1999). 
118Schmid, 423 A.2d at 628 (citing monograph record of 1947 New Jersey constitutional 
convention). Cf. supra text accompanying note 73. 
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which will effectuate the intent of the framers of the Constitution and the 
general intent of the instrument.”119   
The Washington Supreme Court majority decision similarly trumpeted the 
superiority of originalism, in that case over textualism.  In the passage quoted earlier 
in reference to textualism,120 the court declined to infer drafter intent from a textual 
omission. 
The Michigan court referenced records of the 1961 and 1963 state constitutional 
conventions to determine that a state action requirement was intended for the 
Michigan free speech guarantee,121 and to demonstrate that the citizen initiative 
process “was not intended to be easy to fulfill.”122  The same records of drafter intent 
even superseded the effect of plain text.  Though not in a dispositive holding, the 
court wrote that the initiative and referendum provisions of the state constitution, 
reserving power to the people, are self-executing, despite the constitutional decree 
that “[t]he legislature shall implement the provisions of this section.”123 
The courts in New York, Oregon, and Wisconsin also operated in the originalist 
mode.  The New York Court of Appeals, like the Michigan Supreme Court, found a 
state action requirement for the New York Bill of Rights in the proceedings of the 
1821 state constitutional convention.  The Oregon court sought evidence both of 
drafters’ intent and of voters’ understanding124 of relevant constitutional provisions 
when they were adopted in 1902 and 1968 elections, but the court found no helpful 
“objective materials.”125  The Wisconsin court rated originalist inquiries as secondary 
to plain meaning, but asserted anyway that the anti-Pruneyard analysis accorded 
with the “accurate and scholarly recitation of the history of [the state free speech 
provision]” as rendered in an earlier concurring opinion.126  The court further stated 
that any novel theory of constitutional interpretation advanced by a litigant must be 
supported by originalist arguments.127 
2.  Structuralism 
Structuralism “compar[es] the institutional capabilities of the judiciary with those 
of legislatures” to determine when “the latter are probably better qualified to decide 
                                                                
119Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1208 (quoting Borino v. Lounsbury, 86 A. 597 (1913)). 
120See supra text accompanying note 86. 
121Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 346 & n.25. 
122Id. at 350 & n.33 (quoting the convention record: “It’s tough.  We want to make it 
tough.  It should not be easy.  The people should not be writing the laws.  That’s what we have 
a senate and house of representatives for.”). 
123Id. at 348. 
124See supra text accompanying note 117 (regarding “original meaning”). 
125Stranahan, 11 P.3d at 243. 
126Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 837 (citing Jacobs v. Major, 390 N.W.2d 86 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1986) (Gartzke, J., concurring)). 
127Id. at 841 (citing Jacobs, 390 N.W.2d 86). 
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morally sensitive questions for the public.”128  Structuralism is commonly used as a 
mode to buttress conclusions achieved through other interpretivist modes, namely 
textualism and originalism,129 and so it is in the cases studied here.   
Among Pruneyard and its progeny, only the Washington plurality decision 
invoked a structuralist rationale.  The court cited Federalist No. 51 in describing dual 
sovereignty and separation of powers as providing a “double security” to the people 
against abuse of power by government.130  Under this system, the judiciary is bound, 
the court reasoned, to intervene as against the legislature when necessary to protect 
individual rights.131  The court attributed “a reluctance by state courts to interpret and 
to apply their state constitutions” to both “the failure of litigators to claim state 
constitutional errors” and “the fact that often state and federal constitutions have 
conferred the state protections.”132   
Structuralism clearly cuts the other way, limiting judicial power, in five of the 
anti-Pruneyard decisions, including the majority decision in Washington.  Sharply 
differing from the approach of the earlier plurality decision, the Washington 
Supreme Court explained, quoting the American Jurisprudence encyclopedia, that 
“American courts are constantly wary not to trench upon the prerogatives of other 
departments of government or to arrogate to themselves any undue powers, lest they 
disturb the balance of power . . . .”133  Simply employing a balancing test to reconcile 
the competing constitutional interests in expression and property would “arrogat[e] 
to the judicial branch . . . government powers that properly reside with the legislative 
branch of government.”134   
The Washington court then quoted the Connecticut court on the undesirability of 
a balancing solution: 
[T]he legislature . . . has far greater competence and flexibility to deal 
with the myriad complications which may arise from the exercise of 
constitutional rights by some in diminution of those of others. . . .  
Statutes would become largely obsolete if courts in every instance of the 
assertion of conflicting constitutional rights should presume to carve out 
                                                                
128Mick, supra note 64, at 380.  Structuralism may implicate comparisons between various 
expressions, or institutions, of government, such as the state with the federal government, but 
only the judiciary-legislature comparison pertains here. See, e.g., id. at 389-91. 
129See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 64, at 1189 n.16. 
130Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 113 (citing ALEXANDER HAMILTON OR JAMES MADISON, 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 339 (Modern Library ed. 1937)). 
131Id.  
132Id.  
133Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1288 (citing Wash. State Motorcycle Dealers 
Ass’n v. Washington, 763 P.2d 442 (1988) (quoting 16 AM. JUR. 2D  Constitutional Law 
§ 309, at 829-30 (1979))). 
134Id.  
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in the immutable form of constitutional adjudication the precise 
configuration needed to reconcile the conflict.135 
The Supreme Court of Michigan similarly pointed to the legislature’s “superior 
fact-finding ability and general legislative authority” to solve problems of conflicting 
rights,136 and “judicial arrogation” in abrogating the state action requirement also 
concerned the New York Court of Appeals.137  Finally, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, warning that courts must not “become mini-constitutional conventions,” 
invoked structuralist reasoning to press the primacy of interpretivism, through 
textualism and originalism, over activism.138   
3.  Precedentialism 
Stare decisis, or adherence to precedent, rarely stands as a rationale apart, rather, 
like structuralism, it tends to bolster conclusions derived through other interpretivist 
modes.  Moreover, reliance on precedents usually means reliance on previous 
decisions that are in fact derived through other modes of analysis.  Thus, 
precedentialism in a given case might (or might not) in fact represent reliance on a 
string of authorities that consistently adhere to an original vision.  Nevertheless, in 
time, principles derived from precedent can take on lives of their own, becoming 
detached from their analytical roots.  Such principles may even grow beyond the 
analytical justifications that created them.  Thus, one might argue that “the 
Constitution can be understood only by uncovering the layers of practices, 
conventions, and judicial decisions that have accumulated over centuries,” even to 
the exclusion of “the Framer’s initial ‘commands.’”139  Reliance upon precedent, 
therefore, appears in the case law absent any readily demonstrable association with 
underlying modes of analysis.  When this reliance occurs in the cases studied here, 
the rationale is termed “precedentialist.” 
                                                                
135
 Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1288-89 (quoting Cologne, 469 A. 2d at 1210).  
In Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1289 n.25, the Washington Supreme Court also 
pointed to the concurring opinion in Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental 
Council,  in which Justice Dolliver complained that the plurality employed constitutional 
interpretation to usurp the legislative prerogative and “arrogate[] to the court powers 
undreamed of by those who wrote and those who adopted our constitution,” Alderwood 
Assocs., 635 P.2d at 119 (Dolliver, J., concurring).  The majority in Southcenter Joint Venture  
further observed that the judiciary must avoid infringement of the executive prerogative to 
propose and veto legislation.  Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1289. 
136Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 358. 
137SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1216-17 (quoting Montgomery v. Daniels, 340 N.E.2d 
444, 451 (N.Y. 1975); citing Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 119 (Dolliver, J., concurring)). 
138Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 840 (“Courts would be ill-advised to rewrite history and plain, 
clear constitutional language to create some new rights contrary to history.   To do this courts 
would become mini-constitutional conventions in individual court cases whenever a new 
theory or philosophy became appealing. . . .  That is not the right nor privilege of courts or 
judges.”). 
139Pushaw, supra note 64, at 1202-03 (citing Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The 
Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1998); David A. Strauss, Common Law 
Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996)). 
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In analyzing precedentialist rationales in the cases, it is important to distinguish 
between reliance on “domestic” precedent, meaning a state court’s reliance on its 
own prior case law, and perhaps that of subordinate state courts, and reliance on 
“foreign” precedent, meaning a state court’s reliance on the precedents of other 
states.  The distinction is striking: trends in domestic precedents are effective 
predictors of how a court solves the Pruneyard problem, while foreign precedents 
are expressly rejected as often as embraced. 
In the Pruneyard family of cases, four of the five jurisdictions relied on domestic 
trends.  The California and Colorado courts and the Washington plurality all referred 
to domestic trends of expanded state constitutional rights, in relation to federal 
counterparts.140  The Supreme Court of New Jersey embraced its own expansive 
interpretation of state constitutional rights in a pre-Pruneyard criminal trespass 
case.141  The fifth jurisdiction, Massachusetts, cited foreign precedent with 
approval142—at the time of that decision in 1983, a majority of state court decisions 
favored the Pruneyard reasoning—while the Washington plurality cited as 
persuasive the foreign precedents in California and New Jersey.143  For its part, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that most, but not all, foreign precedents 
by 1994 were contrary to its decision.144 
In the anti-Pruneyard family of cases, five of the thirteen jurisdictions—
Michigan, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Wisconsin—observed that their domestic 
trends disfavored the expansive readings of implicated state constitutional provisions 
sought by individual rights advocates.145  Nine of the thirteen jurisdictions referenced 
foreign precedents.  The courts in Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, New York, Ohio, and 
Washington all recognized that they were following a majority trend.146  The 
Michigan Supreme Court, before those six decisions, embraced the Connecticut 
court’s reasoning and rejected Pruneyard and the Washington plurality ruling;147 the 
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin courts followed suit.148 
In review, courts that observed domestic trends to expand or to refrain from 
expanding state constitutional rights tended subsequently to follow those trends.  
Foreign trends, on the other hand, seem to lack such a grip.  Pruneyard initially 
                                                                
140Robins, 592 P.2d at 346-47; Bock, 819 P.2d at 59-60; Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 
113. 
141JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 760-61 (citing Schmid, 423 A.2d at 625-26 (also 
observing domestic trend)). Cf. supra text accompanying note 73. 
142Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at 594. 
143Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 115. 
144JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 769-70. 
145Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 344-45; SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1215; Eastwood 
Mall, Inc., 626 N.E.2d at 61; Stranahan, 11 P.3d at 242-43; Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 838-39. 
146Fiesta Mall Venture, 767 P.2d at 722-23; Citizens for Ethical Gov’t, Inc., 392 S.E.2d at 
9-10; Engler, 641 N.W.2d at 805; SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1214; Eastwood Mall, Inc., 
626 N.E.2d at 61; Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1289. 
147Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 357. 
148W. Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign, 515 A.2d at 1338-39; Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 
841-44. 
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pulled in its wake the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court and the dubious 
Washington plurality.  But once the Connecticut court struck out in a different 
direction, other courts piled on quickly, distancing themselves without difficulty 
from the rapidly fading Pruneyard trend.  Over only a year or two, an anti-
Pruneyard trend emerged, and approval of foreign precedent again became the 
fashion. 
4.  Public Policy 
“Public policy” refers to reasoning that describes the best outcome for society.  
Public policy rationales encompass reasoning based on “living constitutionalism,” 
which seeks to interpret constitutional language “according to evolving notions of 
justice, morality, and social progress.”149  While public policy reasoning radiates the 
appeal of righteousness, Professor Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., observed that the notion of 
evolving constitutional norms “seems to subvert the entire idea of a written 
[c]onstitution, ratified by a supermajority of the People, that establishes a 
fundamental and supreme law that binds everyone (including . . . judges).”150  For 
this want of allegiance to the document being interpreted, or to its authors, public 
policy is not an interpretivist tool.  Nevertheless, public policy arguments may be 
invoked by interpretivists to bolster decisions reached through interpretivist modes.  
The legal realist recognizes that when the call is close on a given legal question, 
public policy can be a strong motivator for a court.  In the arena of state 
constitutional interpretation, where, as thus far demonstrated, courts can disagree 
sharply about a question as straightforward as difference in meaning between nearly 
identical text, the calls are often close. 
Individual rights advocates seeking state constitutional protection for expressive 
conduct on private property universally press a single policy argument: that the 
quasi-public spaces of large private shopping centers in the modern age are 
analogous to the public squares of yore, so should be treated constitutionally as 
public spaces where individuals may exercise civil liberties.  This argument is the 
same “functional equivalent” argument that drove the U.S. Supreme Court “company 
town” decision in Marsh v. Alabama151—but drove it only so far. 
Unsurprisingly, the Pruneyard progeny all followed California’s lead in 
embracing the “functional equivalent” argument as a matter of desirable public 
policy.152  The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, opined eloquently upon the 
danger in “allow[ing] the vagaries of contemporary urban architecture and planning, 
or the lack thereof, to prevail over our valued tradition of free speech.”153 
                                                                
149Pushaw, supra note 64, at 1205 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., Address to the Text and 
Teaching Symposium, Georgetown Univ. (Oct. 12, 1985), reprinted in THE GREAT DEBATE: 
INTERPRETING OUR WRITTEN CONSTITUTION 11, 11, 14-17, 19-25 (1986)); see also Brennan, 
supra note 36, at 503 (inviting “state courts to step into the breach” ). 
150Pushaw, supra note 64, at 1205 (citing LINO A. GRAGLIA, COURTING DISASTER: THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE DEMISE OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 5-38 (1997); ANTONIN SCALIA, A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 38-47 (1997)). 
151326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
152Robins, 592 P.2d at 347; Bock, 819 P.2d at 62; JMB Realty Corp., 650 A.2d at 761, 
766-67, 772-75; Batchelder, 445 N.E.2d at 595; Alderwood Assocs., 635 P.2d at 116. 
153Bock, 819 P.2d at 62. 
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Among the anti-Pruneyard cases, nine of the thirteen decisions clearly 
contemplated policy arguments.  The courts in Arizona, Iowa, and Wisconsin found 
simply that shopping centers are not the equivalent of public property or company 
towns, the Wisconsin court observing that a shopping center “concerns itself only 
with one facet of its patrons’ lives—how they spend their money.”154  The courts in 
Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington went 
further, rejecting public policy ends per se when they cannot be achieved through 
legal means.155  Those courts struck at the Achilles heel of public policy arguments: 
courts’ refusal to substitute judicial preferences for constitutional interpretations. 
V.  CONCLUSION: NOT TEXTUALISM, BUT NO CLEAR RULE;  
AND A NEED FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In the cases considered here, textualism tended to weigh heavily only when it 
was consistent with courts’ conclusions on other grounds.  Whether the language of 
state constitutional provisions is affirmative or, like the First Amendment, negative, 
is not, then, by itself helpful in predicting whether a state court will read the state 
language expansively to protect individual liberties when federal constitutional 
guarantees do not.  The court that favors expansive construction likely will 
contemplate textualist reasoning, whether or not the language is plainly 
distinguishable, while the court disposed to restrictive construction of state-protected 
liberties likely will either reject textualism or stretch textualist reasoning, perhaps by 
changing the level of abstraction, to support the court’s conclusion. 
If textualism did not drive these state court decisions, what did?  The courts 
expanding individual liberties under state constitutions treated originalism sparingly, 
if at all.  Meanwhile about half of jurisdictions declining to augment state 
constitutional authority advanced originalism as a controlling mode of analysis.  
Horizontal structuralism—particularly regarding the relationship of state judiciary 
and legislature—appeared almost not at all in the pro-Pruneyard cases, but appeared 
in five of the thirteen anti-Pruneyard decisions. 
Domestic precedentialism was important to almost all of the Pruneyard cases and 
to five of the thirteen anti-Pruneyard cases.  Trends in domestic precedent 
concerning the construction of state constitutional provisions were therefore better 
correlated across the board to courts’ conclusions than any other mode of analysis.  
Foreign precedentialism carried some weight in the few years following Pruneyard, 
but courts readily abandoned the Pruneyard trend once a contrary example was set.  
Foreign precedentialism soon thereafter regained momentum in the opposite 
direction, suggesting that the rationale is pliable and unpredictable.   
Finally, non-interpretivist public policy arguments tracked textualism in 
significance.  The pro-Pruneyard courts embraced both, while three anti-Pruneyard 
                                                                
154
 Fiesta Mall Venture, 767 P.2d at 724 (quoting Jacobs, 407 N.W.2d at 845); Engler, 
641 N.W.2d at 806. 
155Cologne, 469 A.2d at 1209-10; Citizens for Ethical Gov’t, Inc., 392 S.E.2d at 9; 
Woodland, 378 N.W.2d at 353, 357-58; SHAD Alliance, 488 N.E.2d at 1216; W. Pa. Socialist 
Workers 1982 Campaign, 485 A.2d at 1336 (“Law and sociology are not coextensive.”); 
Southcenter Joint Venture, 780 P.2d at 1290-92 (“‘[W]hether [the “state action” requirement] 
is good or bad policy, it is a fundamental fact of our political order.’” (emphasis removed) 
(quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982))). 
27Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
426 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:399 
decisions rejected the very same policy arguments on their merits.  Six other anti-
Pruneyard courts rejected public policy arguments per se, regarding them as 
unpersuasive in state constitutional interpretation—much like the Michigan Supreme 
Court rejected textualism, whether to read identical language similarly or to construe 
affirmative language differently from negative. 
This Article reviews a narrow range of case law in an effort to make 
generalizations about state constitutional interpretation.  In the end, one can say that 
generally, from a multi-state perspective, textual distinction between affirmative and 
negative language in state constitutional provisions is not indicative of the import of 
those provisions relative to their federal constitutional counterparts.  This conclusion 
begs for further research to ask, why not?  How can some courts acknowledge that 
the plain difference between affirmative and negative language is all-important, 
while other courts can find it utterly insignificant?  Courts point to other 
interpretivist tools, such as originalism, to bolster anti-textualist conclusions.  
Historical research is required to determine whether in fact the nearly identical 
language in various state constitutions is properly understood to have been implanted 
with such diverse intentions.156 
In examining modes of analysis besides textualism, generalizations are difficult 
to draw.157  Other interpretivist tools—originalism, structuralism, and 
precedentialism—and public policy are each at times highly influential.  But none of 
these approaches dominates.  True, trends in domestic precedent seem best predictive 
of a court’s ultimate decision.  But that result is disappointing.  Domestic precedent 
by itself is something of an empty rationale, as one might expect that principles 
repeated in domestic precedent must have emerged historically from some other 
analytical approach.  Thus, this dependence on domestic precedent invites further 
research:  Where does California and New Jersey activism come from?158  Why is no 
similar trend apparent in South Carolina (nor in any southern state)?  And ultimately, 
how are activist trends started or stopped? 
Most importantly, with regard to needed further research, the generalizations 
drawn in this study should be tested against other pools of case law.  Are the same 
trends evidenced in state decisions on search and seizure?  Cruel and unusual 
punishment?  Due process and equal protection?  Through these additional inquiries, 
one can refine these results and eliminate variations that might depend on the subject 
matter of the constitutional question at issue.159 
                                                                
156Cf. Simon, supra note 16, at 309-20.  A correct answer might evade even the most 
vigorous originalist inquiry, as, according to Professor Simon, “these early state constitutional 
provisions were adopted virtually without discussion or analysis.  Their meanings and 
applications apparently were considered universally understood.”  Id. at 310 (footnote 
omitted).  Nevertheless, Professor Simon concluded in 1985 that “[a] logical starting point for 
a solution to disparate decisions would be intense study and reflection on the actual 
differences in various state provisions.  Opposite results on similar language are difficult to 
accept.”  Id. at 339. 
157This result is consistent with the findings of Professor Simon.  See Simon, supra note 
62, at 320-37. 
158See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 149, at 498-99 (discussing innovations in state 
constitutional rights in, inter alia, California and New Jersey: “Enlightenment comes also 
from the New Jersey Supreme Court”). 
159Cf. supra discussion of Fine et al., accompanying note 66. 
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At least in the narrow realm of expressive activity in private shopping centers, 
the present trend in state decisions disfavors the augmentation of state constitutional 
liberties.  Nevertheless, under the system of dual sovereignty, in part preserved 
through the Tenth Amendment, states retain the power to buck that trend.  Perhaps, 
as the Washington plurality suggested, state courts are reluctant to apply their state 
constitutions because litigators fail to raise the claims.  Perhaps state courts simply 
do not want the aggravation of litigation that might result from new doctrines in state 
constitutional law. 
In Arkansas, it appeared that aggravation with a U.S. Supreme Court remand, 
rather than with litigants, led to expansive construction of state constitutional 
equivalents to the Fourth Amendment.160  In two cases in 2002, the ordinarily 
decorous Arkansas Supreme Court surprised criminal defense attorneys when it 
departed from precedent that had regarded state constitutional liberties as 
coextensive with federal constitutional law.161  Advocates who desire such outcomes, 
and those who do not, stand to gain from continuing research into the reasoning of 
state courts in cases of individual liberties under state constitutions. 
 
                                                                
160See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d 215, 216-22 (Ark. 2002), on remand from 532 
U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam), rev’g 16 S.W.3d 551, denying reh’g on 11 S.W.3d 526 (Ark. 
2000).  In Professor Simon’s typology, see supra note 62, this state decision is clearly 
“reactive.” See Simon, supra note 16, at 315-17. 
161Sullivan, 74 S.W.3d at 216-21 (distinguishing, among other things, Stout v. Arkansas, 
898 S.W.2d 457 (Ark. 1995)); Griffin v. Arkansas, 67 S.W.3d 582, 584-85 (Ark. 2002). 
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